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RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE WTO: THE LIMITS OF
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
James J. Nedumpara
This paper examines the role of the government in designing and supporting renewable energy programs and the
compatibility of such interventions with various covered agreements of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’). The
WTO treaty does not provide a special framework for renewable energy and a number of programs are susceptible
to WTO challenges and domestic trade contingency measures. Of particular interest to developing countries such as
India will be the availability of necessary policy space in fostering various renewable energy programs. This paper
discusses the current treaty provisions of the WTO, especially the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (‘SCM Agreement’) and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (‘TRIMs Agreement’)
and examines the extent of space in policy making available to various WTO Members across varying levels of
development. In short, the paper seeks to examine the limits of WTO-consistent government intervention in the field
of renewable energy.
Introduction
The world’s leading economies have been pledging support for developing alternative and cleaner
forms of energy, especially in the new millennium. According to the International Energy Agency
(‘IEA’), fossil fuels (oil, coal, and natural gas) will remain the dominant source of energy for the
immediate future, but their share in the energy mix is bound to progressively decline in the future.
IEA estimates that renewable energy demand may increase in 2035 by an amount ranging from 14
percent to 27 percent.
Recent years have witnessed massive growth in investment in the renewable energy sector in some
of the developed countries. In the United States, renewable energy constitutes almost twelve
percent of the total energy capacity. Focus on clean energy also means that the scope of
governmental intervention has risen significantly. President Obama’s FY 2013 budget, which seeks
to support the continued manufacture, development and deployment of clean energy technologies,
includes $5 billion in tax credits.1 Similar measures have been adopted by various countries,



Assistant Dean and Executive Director, Center for International Trade and Economic Laws, Jindal Global
Law School, NCR of Delhi. India. The author may be reached at: jnedumpara@jgu.edu.in.
The blueprint for A Secure Energy Future: Progress Report (2012) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/emailfiles/the_blueprint_for_a_secure_energy_future_o
neyear_progress_report.pdf
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including the EU and Japan.2
The BRICS group (consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has already emerged
as a major consumer of energy resources. China has recently overtaken the United States as the
largest consumer of energy and energy-related resources. However, China has initiated several
programs for generation of renewable energy. China is the leading installer of wind turbines and
solar systems in the world.3 It is also the leading hydropower producer. Likewise, India is one of
the first countries in the world to establish a dedicated Ministry of Non-conventional Energy
Resources. Since its launch in 2010, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) has
been a key feature of the National Action Plan on Climate Change.4 India has set a target of scaling
up to at least ten percent of all new capacity in the field of renewable energy. Brazil, another
prominent BRICS country, has been supporting the Program of Incentives for Alternative
Electricity Resources (PROFINA) since 2002. Brazil is also the second largest producer (after the
United States) of fuel ethanol and the world’s largest exporter of ethanol.
There are other developed countries that have initiated massive programs for promoting renewable
energy. Germany is the pioneer, and perhaps, the most successful country in the world in
introducing a Feed-in-Tariff (‘FiT’) scheme. A FiT Scheme provides a guaranteed tariff to
electricity produced from renewable energy sources.5 The German FiT law, which was introduced
in 1990, required utilities to provide renewable energy generators grid access and also purchase the
energy produced. The German FiT program, which has since been revised, imposes an obligation
on private distribution and transmission system operators to purchase and share the costs of
paying the statute mandated tariff to the renewable energy producers. Germany’s success in

Arunabha Ghosh and Himani Gangania, Governing Clean Energy Subsidies: What, Why and How Legal, ICTSD
Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy, 29-36, (August 2012), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/09/governing-clean-energy-subsidies-what-why-and-how-legal.pdf
2
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Renewable Energy Policy Network, Renewables 2011 Global Status Report, (September 2010).

The JNNSM seeks to install 22 GW of solar power (grid and off-grid) using both PV and concentrated
solar power technologies by 2022.
4

A FiT is essentially a purchasing guarantee. This is generally done by the government through electricity
utilities (may be either private or public bodies) on the directions of the government. In the case of the FiT
scheme run by the Ontario Power Authority, a body that was created by provincial government statute in
2004, the program allows both large-scale (above ten kilowatts) and small scale (less than ten kilowatts)
private energy producers with qualifying renewable energy fuel sources (including solar photovoltaic cells,
water, wind and bioenergy production systems) to resell generated energy back onto the Ontario electricity
grid at a fixed price for a twenty-year period.
5
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introducing the FiT program has inspired several countries, including Canada.6 As of now, nearly
sixty-three countries have started offering FiTs.7 The Canadian province of Ontario introduced
the FiT and the micro FiT program, which is now in the midst of a WTO challenge.8 The Preamble
of the Green Energy Act passed by the Canadian government provides that the legislation strives
towards “cleaner sources of energy” as well as the promotion of both, renewable energy projects
and a “green economy”.
The focus on clean and renewable forms of energy is indeed welcomed by all. However, the
development of renewable energy programs has also raised significant concerns. The subsidies for
renewable energy were about US $ 66 billion in 2010 alone. In the new policy scenario, subsidies
to renewable energy will reach US$250 billion in 2035. Renewable energy support schemes are
generally in the form of targets, mandatory quotas, price support (e.g. FiTs), tax incentives such as
Production Tax Credits (PTC), Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), loans, grants, and various
types of incentive schemes.9
The subsidies and other government support assume various forms. In China, the grants to
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers were conditioned on use of key parts and components made
in China rather than purchasing imports.10 In Canada, the Ontario FiT program requires the solar
and wind facilities to meet domestic content requirements, i.e., 60 percent and 50 percent for solar
and wind projects respectively. India requires solar power developers, or their successors in
contract, to purchase and use solar cells and solar modules of domestic origin in order to
participate in the JNNSM and to enter into and maintain power purchase agreements under the
JNNSM or with the National Thermal Power Company Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Limited. As a result,
solar power developers, or their successors in contract, receive certain benefits and advantages,
including subsidies, through guaranteed, long-term tariffs for electricity, contingent on their
Canada enacted the Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2008, which provided statutory support
to the FiT program. See Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 12, Schedule B, available
at http://www.ontla.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2004/elaws_src_s4023_e.htm
6

7

REN21 Secretariat, Renewables Global Status Report: Update (2009).

Panel Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/R,
(Complainant - Japan) WT/DS426/R (Complainant – EU), (December 19, 2012). FiT program is applicable
to projects generating more than 10kW, while the micro-FiT program targets individuals interested in smallscale projects not exceeding 10kW. The Ontario Power Authority (OPA) is responsible for managing and
administering the FiT program in Ontario.
8

M S Srikar, Renewable Energy Programmes in the European Union, Japan and the United States: Compatibility with
WTO Law, Centre for WTO Studies (CWS) Working Paper # 200/4, (August 27, 2012), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstracts=2179621.
9
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The size of the individual grants ranged between $6.7 million and $22.5 million.
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purchase and use of solar cells and solar modules of domestic origin.11
Renewable energy technologies such as solar, wind, geothermal and biomass power generation are
gaining traction and popularity, but are not yet viable at a utility scale level to play a significant role
in a country’s energy mix. The inability to internalize the cost of greenhouses gas (GHG) emissions
has caused significant underpricing of non-renewable forms of energy. This market failure has also
resulted in significant sub-optimal production of renewable energy. Economic theory posits that
public intervention may be required when market fails to provide desirable public goods or prevent
negative externalities. A number of firms in the renewable energy sector face complex risks
involving future changes in demand, pricing, grid connection to wider markets, cost return on
capital and other key performance and regulatory risks. The renewable energy industry is still
developing and the economic viability of most such projects is uncertain. In addition, the discovery
of shale gas has the potential to slow the development of renewable sources of energy. A recent
study by KPMG, a consulting firm, indicates that the energy industry’s focus on developing shale
gas and other unconventional sources of energy could disrupt the economic viability of renewable
energy and could potentially take the focus away from this sector. 12 Notwithstanding the above
scenario, a number of developed and emerging economies have committed themselves to the
production of renewable energy (See Table I).

Table I: Top Five Producers of Renewable Energy
New Capacity Hydropower Solar PV
Wind
Capacity Capacity Power
Capacity
China
China
Italy
China
United States

Vietnam

Germany

Germany
Italy

Brazil
India

China
United
States

United
States
India
Germany

Biodiesel Ethanol
Production Production

Solar Hot
water/heat

United
States
Germany

United
States
Brazil

China
Turkey

Argentina
Brazil

China
Canada

Germany
India

Press Release, United States Challenges India’s Restrictions on U.S. Solar Exports, (February 12, 2013), available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/pressreleases/2013/february/us-challenges-indiarestrictions-solar.
11

KPMG,
Shale
Gas:
Global
Perspectives,
19,
(2011)
http://www.gses.com/images/documents/shale-gas-global-perspective.pdf.
12

available

at
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5
France

France

Italy

Source: REN21 Report (2012)
It is widely perceived that the market for renewable energy is unstable under present conditions
and that some form of government support is generally desirable or justifiable. Strong government
policies may be required to provide a predictable environment. However, a spate of antidumping
and CVD measures on renewable energy parts and components and multiple challenges before
the WTO against some of the renewable energy programs have raised the issue whether the current
international trading regime is against renewable energy initiatives.13
This article examines the nature and characteristics of the renewable energy sector and explores
the extent to which public or governmental support can be extended to the renewable energy
sector. In particular, Section A examines how some of the governmental support to the renewable
energy sector is constrained by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement).14 Section B examines the compatibility of domestic content requirement in some of
the renewable energy programs and examines how it comports with various WTO provisions
including the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement).15 Section C
examines the applicability of General Exceptions under the GATT in justifying the violations of
various covered agreements under the WTO. Section D concludes.
Renewable Energy and Subsidies
Subsidies to renewable energy sector operate at different levels and are given at different stages.
In certain cases, governments may provide subsidies to producers of renewable energy whereas in
other cases governments may subsidize consumers of renewable energy products. Certain
countries provide rebate on electricity bills whereas others provide preferential tax credits, low
interest loans or investment credits. In China, subsidies were provided to cover installation costs
for both grid and off-grid connections, in addition to other benefits, such as cheap land,

Joost Pauwelyn, Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the Environment 5, (2010), available at
http://www.cepr.org/press/CTEI-CEPR.pdf.
13

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, (Adopted on April 15, 1994), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
14

Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures, (Adopted on April 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
15
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preferential contracts from state-owned entities, and low interest government loans.16
Governments may also use carbon taxes and other market based instruments.
Each of the above examples presents challenges that are unique. If subsidies are given to domestic
renewable energy products as opposed to imported products it may clearly result in a violation of
Article III, the national treatment provision of General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). 17
On the other hand, tax credits or preferential loans at the behest of the government could involve
a direct transfer of funds and can be easily classified as a subsidy, a practice regulated by the SCM
Agreement.
Furthermore, renewable energy programs also differ widely in their scope and nature. FiT schemes
have gained popularity in recent times and need a special discussion. Broadly, FiT schemes have a
regulatory component and vary significantly in terms of their nature and design. FiT schemes
generally ensure price certainty for the generators. The nature of the energy market in many
countries is such that the government does not play an active role in the electricity market in
producing, transmitting and distributing energy. However, under a FiT, a utility is contractually
obliged to connect renewable energy generators to the grid and pay the generators for the electricity
for the life of the FiT contract. In the case of most FiTs, the government does not make the
payment directly, but only mandates a guaranteed tariff. The provision of a guaranteed price
support is to encourage the RE sector. The FiT rates are not generally aligned with the market and
the program costs may be very high; however, in such cases most of the FiT programs pass on the
cost to the ratepayers.
It is an established fact that a large number of currently implemented FiT programs are
disassociated from the market price. For example, eighteen out of the twenty-seven European
Union member-states have adopted schemes guaranteeing minimum resale prices for renewably
produced electricity. The fixed tariff is just the pricing element of the FiT incentive. In addition to
this, FiT schemes include other terms either to reinforce the package of incentives, or to implement
the program on a long-term basis.18

Keith Bradsher, To Conquer Wind Power, China writes the Rules, N.Y.TIMES, (December 14, 2010). The
steelworkers’ petition cites various forms of subsidies and support that China has given to its industries in
potential violation of international trade rules.
16

Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833, BISD 7S/60,
(October 23, 1958).
17

Luca Rubini, The Subsidization of Renewable Energy in the WTO: Issues and Perspectives, NCCR Trade Working
Paper, (2011).
18
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In examining the role of subsidies in encouraging clean and renewable energy programs, it is
essential to examine the conflict between the role of the government and the distortionary impact
of subsidies. In particular, all renewable energy programs will have to pass the test laid down by
the SCM Agreement. The following discussion focuses on the concept of subsidy under the SCM
Agreement and examines whether some of the renewable energy programs and, in particular, the
FiT programs would raise concerns from the perspective of this Agreement.
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement provides a definition of the term “subsidy”. According to
Article 1.1, a determination of “subsidy” rests on satisfaction of two elements: (1) a financial
contribution or income or price support by a public body; and (2) a conferral of “benefit” upon
the recipient. The four types of “financial contribution” which are explicitly mentioned in Article
1.1 appear to be straightforward. They are:


A direct transfer of funds;



Government revenue that is “otherwise due” is foregone or not collected.



A provision of goods or services or the purchase of goods or services by a government;
and



A government payment to a funding mechanism, or where the government entrusts or
directs a private body to carry out a particular policy.

In addition to the above two requirements, a subsidy has to be meet the “specificity” test to fall
under the disciplines of the SCM Agreement. A subsidy can qualify as “specific” in two different
ways. Under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, all export subsidies are import substitution subsidies
are specific. Other subsidies can also be specific if they meet with the criteria under Articles 2.1
and 2.2 of the SCM Agreement.19
The financial contribution should from the government or a public body. One of the critical issues
involved in the debate is the definition of a ‘public body’. A WTO panel in Korea-Commercial Vessels
pronounced that an entity is a public body when the government controls it.20 More recently, the
Appellate Body in United States-AD/CVD21 decided that the evidence of a controlling interest itself
Where a subsidy is explicitly limited to a sector or a region, either by the granting agency, or by legislation,
it is de jure specific. On the other hand, where the authority or legislation establishes objective criteria or
conditions governing the eligibility for, and amount of a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that
the eligibility is automatic and the criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. See SCM Agreement, art 2.
19

20

Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, (April 11, 2005).

Appellate Body Report, United States- Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from
China, ¶ 290, WT/ DS 379/AB/R (March 25, 2011).
21
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is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public body. According to the Appellate Body,
“meaningful [governmental] control over an entity and its conduct may serve … as evidence that
the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the
performance of governmental functions.” What is of relevance is whether the function of
providing guaranteed tariff for renewable energy or enforcing a different type of renewable energy
program is “normally vested” in the government, i.e., whethe the government would have normally
performed this function instead of directing private entities to undertake it.
Assuming that government’s role in renewable energy programs is quite prominent and
uncontestable, it may be possible to establish that most of the government utilities or other funding
agencies established and controlled by the state would qualify the definition of a public body.
It is also important to consider that financial contribution can be either direct or indirect. Mostly,
in the case of FiT programs, a financial contribution presumably arises when the concerned
governmental agency signs the FiT contract with the FiT generator and agrees to provide
guaranteed rates. A direct transfer may arise when the public body transfers the difference between
the market rate of electricity that the generator would receive under the standard operation of the
market and the rate guaranteed under the FiT contract. Under the FiT contract, the FiT generators
commit to supply the generated electricity into the grid in exchange of payment of the agreed rates.
Such generation of electricity is expected in order to obtain the guaranteed rate, which provides in
itself a benefit to the FiT generator. The panel noted in EC-Large Aircraft as follows:
[W]hen assessing whether a transaction involves a “potential direct transfer of funds”, the focus
should be on the existence of a governmental practice that involves an obligation to make a
direct transfer of funds which, in and of itself, is claimed and capable of conferring a benefit on
the recipient that is separate and independent from the benefit that might be conferred from
any direct transfer of funds. This can be contrasted with financial contributions in the form of
direct transfer of funds, which will result in a benefit being conferred on a recipient when there
is governmental practice that involves a direct transfer of funds.22
Another interesting issue is whether the FiT schemes involve a purchase of electricity by any public
body within the meaning of Article 1.1 (a) (i) (iii) of the SCM Agreement? A clear answer to this
question would depend on the type of the underlying FiT arrangement or model. Nonetheless, it
appears that if the concerned public body dealing with the energy sector pays or undertakes to pay
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States- Measures Affecting Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 7.304,
WT/DS 316/R (1 June, 2011) (as modified by the Appellate Body).
22
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a certain price (which includes the FiT) as a consideration for the delivery of electricity into its
transmission network which it owns and controls, it involves a sale and purchase transaction.
Assuming that electricity is a good,23 the essence of a bilateral contractual transaction between the
public body and the renewable energy generators could properly place this transaction as a
“purchase of goods” within the meaning of Article 1.1 (a) (i) (iii) of the SCM Agreement. To that
extent, the characterization of this transaction as a “purchase of goods” appears more appropriate
than an unqualified “transfer of funds”. The WTO panel in Canada-Renewable Energy observed that
a FiT or micro FiT program, as implemented in that case, could be appropriately characterized as
a “government purchase of goods”.24
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) also encompasses the case in which a government “entrusts or directs” a
private body to effectuate a financial contribution as understood to carry out one or more of the
functions enlisted in para (i)—(iii) of Article 1.1 (a) (i) of the SCM Agreement (hence encompassing
the scenario where a private energy provider is entrusted to run a FiT program by government).
For example, in Germany, the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz(EEG) statutorily “directs” the
private parties to purchase electricity sourced by renewable energy technologies.25 This type of a
scenario may not involve a cost to the government, but nonetheless could satisfy the requirements
of a financial contribution.
Even if a government’s involvement in the RE sector does not amount to a financial contribution,
it can be found as an “income or price support” within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM
Agreement or Article XVI of the GATT. The term “support” is often used in the context of
agriculture, especially with respect to government support programs for farm products. In the
ordinary meaning, “support” denotes “the action of contributing to the success or maintaining the
value of something”. In the light of this ordinary meaning, the meaning of “support” within Article
1.1 (a) (2) refers to the action of the government that directly or indirectly increases the export of
any product from its territory or reduces the imports of any product within its territory. The
Appellate Body in United States- Softwood Lumber noted that the range of government measures
capable of providing subsidies is broadened still further by the concept of "income or price

23

There is no affirmative finding on this issue, but the WTO panel seems to have acknowledged this fact.

24

Panel Report, Canada- Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Supra note 8 at ¶ 7.11.

Germany’s FiT program is one of the few FiT programs that do not rely upon a public body or State
actor for the provision and management of FiT payments. See Laird and Stefes, The Diverging Paths of German
and United States Policies for Renewable Energy: Source of Difference, 37 ENERGY POLICY 2619, 2624 (2009).
25
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support" in paragraph (2) of Article 1.1(a).26 Some academic commenters also suggest that the
expression “income or price support” falling under Article 1.1 (a) (2) of the SCM Agreement could
be a better alternative to the expression “financial contribution” appearing in Article 1.1 (a) (1) in
properly characterizing and dealing with most FiT schemes.27
In the light of the discussion above, it appears almost certain that most government intervention
either under a FiT scheme or direct support will fall under one of the gateways provided under
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. In other words, most government intervention could be
characterized either as a “financial contribution” or as a form of “income or price support” under
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
The second essential element required for the determination of a subsidy is the conferral of
“benefit”. The term “benefit” in Article 1.1(b) implies a financial contribution that places the
recipient in a more advantageous position than would have been the case but for the financial
contribution. It means that a financial contribution will only confer a “benefit”, i.e., an advantage,
if it is provided on terms that are more advantageous than those that would have been available to
the recipient in the market.28 As the Canada- Aircraft panel reiterated, the existence of “benefit” (in
the context of financing) is determined by reference to the terms at which similar financing is
available to the customer in the market.29 In EC-DRAMS, the WTO Panel noted that the existence
of a benefit is a constitutive element of the definition of a subsidy. The panel also noted, “…only
in cases where the financial contribution provides the recipient with an advantage over and above
what it could have obtained on the market will the government’s financial contribution be
considered to have conferred a benefit and will a subsidy thus be deemed to exist.”30 The panel
further clarified, “if the public or publicly directed financial contribution is provided under the
same conditions as a private market player would have provided, then there would be no reason
Appellate Body, United States- Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, ¶52, WT/DS 257/AB/R (Feb. 17, 2004).
26

LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID, WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (2009). There is a contrary view that price regulation in the context of utilities or network
industries ought not to be considered as a price support under Article 1.1 (a) (2). See Robert Howse, Climate
Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis 12-13 (International Institute of
Sustainable Development, Trade, Investment and Climate Change Series) (2010).
27

Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 154, WT/DS70/AB/W
(Adopted on August 20, 1999) [hereinafter Canada- Aircraft].
28

Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of
The DSU, ¶ 9.112, WT/DS70/RW, WT/DS70/AB/RW (Adopted on August 4, 2000).
29

Panel Report, European Communities – Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from
Korea, ¶7.175,WT/DS299/R (Adopted on August 3, 2005)[hereinafter EC- DRAMS].
30
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to impose any discipline, simply because the financial contribution was provided by the
government.”
The relevant benchmark for the purpose of determining the existence of a benefit is the market.
The Appellate Body in EC- Large Aircraft noted as follows:
The market place to which the Appellate Body referred to in Canada- Aircraft reflects the sphere
in which goods and services are exchanged between willing buyers and sellers. A calculation of
benefit in relation to prevailing market conditions thus demands an examination of behavior on
both sides of a transaction, and in particular, in relation to the conditions of supply and demand
as they apply to that market.31
The generators of renewable energy might seek a return on their investment to cover their costs.
In most of the FiT programs, the prices in the price schedule are intended to cover development
costs plus a reasonable rate of return projects. Furthermore, the fact that the public body imposes
fees and charges on consumers to recoup the high costs involved in the generation of the electricity
through the FiT program indicate that that the electricity generated through the FiT program
would not be sold without the FiT program.
In the Canada- Renewable Energy dispute, Japan and the European Union argued that the FiT price
exceeded various wholesale electricity market price benchmarks (inside and outside Ontario). They
also argued that the very nature and objectives of the FiT program are intended to facilitate private
investment in renewable electricity generation that the market would not otherwise provide.
Canada, however, defended its measure arguing that the benefit analysis should be made with
reference to the ‘market’ for electricity produced from wind and solar PV technologies, and not to
benchmarks - such as those suggested by Japan and the EU - which reflect a single price for
electricity, irrespective of its origin.
In regard to the determination of “benefit” the majority Panel agreed with Canada to the effect
that Ontario’s wholesale electricity market cannot offer any reliable benchmark because it is
distorted by the government. The majority Panel concluded that there is no benefit, and
consequently no subsidy, because there would not have been any similar investment in the market,
i.e. an investment delivering the same goods as desired by Ontario (what the Panel describes as

Appellate Body, European Communities and Certain Member States- Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, ¶ 981, WT/DS 316/AB/R (June 1, 2011)[hereinafter EC- Large Civil Aircraft].
31
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the ‘missing money problem’).32 The panel noted that if the price achieved on the “organized”
wholesale market is not allowed to rise to a level, which fully compensates generators for the allin cost their investment (both fixed and sunk costs), private investors will not be willing to finance
construction of new electricity generation under such conditions.33 In the panel’s view, alternative
mechanisms to wholesale spot markets was required to provide long term investment to meet
forecasted demand.34
Some of the rationale provided by the panel to determine the consistency of the subsidy aspects
of the FiT program may be reviewed or modified by the Appellate Body. It seems almost selfevident that without the FiT program market forces in Ontario (and possibly in other parts of the
world as well) would not lead to the reliable supply of renewable energy electricity which is desired
for environmental and energy goals.35
In conclusion, in the renewable energy sector, the delineation of the market and the choice of the
appropriate benchmarks for benefit determination will remain contentious. This debate will
essentially determine the extent to which governments could subsidize renewable energy
programs. It needs to be, however, reiterated that not all renewable energy subsidies are per se
prohibited. However, if a subsidy is contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods,
such a requirement could convert the subsidy into a prohibited subsidy. The Canada FiT program
is one such category where the FiT generator was required to purchase or use energy generation
equipments and components that are of Canadian origin or from a Canadian source. In other
words, if renewable energy subsidies do not fall within category, i.e. under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement, the existence of adverse effects36 is essential for applying the other disciplines of the
SCM Agreement to these categories of subsidies. Furthermore, a subsidy must be specific to
certain industries or enterprises in order to be actionable under the SCM Agreement.37 A number
32

Panel Report, Canada- Renewable Energy, supra note 8, ¶ 7.283.

33

Id.

34

Supra note 32

Supra note 32 at ¶ 7.284 (the Panel notes that because of the specific features of electricity and the nature
of competitive wholesale electricity markets, government intervention will often be necessary in order to
secure an electricity supply that is safe, reliable and sustainable in the long-term).
35

The various tests for adverse effects can be found in Article 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement: (i) injury to
the domestic industry, (ii) nullification and impairment of benefits, i.e. tariff concessions, and (iii) serious
prejudice in various forms mainly of displacement and price effects in various markets.
36

See Supra note 14. In terms of Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy cannot be specific if the
eligibility for the subsidy depends on ‘objective criteria or conditions’, i.e criteria or conditions which are
neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and
horizontal in application, such as number of employees or sizes of enterprises’.
37
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of antidumping and countervailing duty actions have come up against various forms of state
support given to parts and equipments used for renewable energy production.38 But these trade
contingent actions are unlikely to stop government intervention in the renewable energy sector.
So long as the renewable energy subsidies do not fall within the prohibited category, the WTO
members will have some leeway in implementing government subsidies, albeit in a selective way.
Section B examines the nature and WTO consistency of domestic content requirements in some
of the renewable energy programs.
Renewable Energy and Trade-related Investment Measures
The SCM Agreement prohibits export subsidies and other types of subsidies that are conditioned
on the use of domestically manufactured products. Subsidies that impose purchase obligations
based on the origin of energy or technology can be a prohibited subsidy and can fall foul of the
obligations under the TRIMs Agreement.
According to development scholars, export subsidies and local content requirements were key
elements in the industrialization of number of “late industrializers”.39 Similar arguments are raised
in relation to local content requirements in renewable energy programs. Local content
requirements are widely considered as effective tools in industrial policy in as much as they ensure
steady and fast development of an important and newly emerging domestic renewable energy
sector.40 A number of renewable energy programs require use of local content to encourage the
local firms to either promote the domestic manufacturing sector or to create employment.41

U.S. Sets Antidumping Duties on Chinese Solar panels, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (October 11, 2012); In the case of
China, the NME methodology under the antidumping measure is used as a proxy to deal with various types
of subsidization as well. See also http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/wave-oftrade-disputes-complicates-global-market-for-renewable-energy-firms-particularly-solar-sector.
38

Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization: The
Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INTL. L. 551, 561 (2012) (arguing that TRIMS Agreement is not too
stringent in practice in enabling developing countries to maintain their local content requirements in
important sectors).
39

40

Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (2008).

Since 2005, Brazil has required that at least 60 percent of the total cost of wind energy products is sourced
from Brazil. A number of EU countries have also implemented local content requirements in the renewable
energy sector. In 2011, Italy has enacted local content requirements in their legislation for subsidization of
solar energy based on the sourcing of renewable energy equipments and components. In 2012, France
imposed a local content requirement wherein the government offers a 10% bonus on the price that
Electricite de France (EDF) pays to the solar energy installers. The bonus is available only when 60% of
the added value of the installed solar panels is generated within the EU. Again, in the United States, several
states including Montana and Louisiana have a local content rule in their blending mandate for bio-fuels.
See Jan- Christph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, Local Contents Requirements and the Renewable Energy Industry:
A Good Match? (September 12, 2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2188607.
41
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Especially in the cases of countries such as China, the local content rules are considered to have
been successful in helping transfer of technology and knowhow. It is reported that in the field of
wind turbine equipment manufacturing industry, the five largest Chinese companies had growth
rates of more than 113%.42
In most renewable energy programs involving local content requirements, the government
provides subsidies in the form of tax rebates or credits contingent upon compliance of local
content requirements. In particular, some of the state sponsored renewable energy support
programs require that the concerned energy equipments are manufactured or principally
manufactured in certain parts of the state or specific percentage of manufacturing or assembling
is carried out in that region or by using domestic feedstock, etc.43
Local content requirements in the context of FiT programs are particularly problematic. FiT
schemes are different from other renewable energy programs in as much as they may have heavy
project costs and longer gestation periods. For most such programs to be politically feasible, it
may be important to encourage local employment creation. Therefore, even if it is admitted that
local content requirements have inefficient outcomes in the long run, it will be politically difficult
for most governments to set apart government funds for green energy programs. Beyond this,
most local content requirements, at least, indirectly support green industries- an objective that is
laudable in itself. For example, the Canadian Minister’s FiT Directive to the Ontario Power Board
lists various objectives that, inter alia, include measures to “[e]nable green industries through new
investment in renewable energy technologies”.44Therefore, global technological innovation in
renewable energy could be considered as a public good, which could significantly outweigh the
baneful effects of local content or import substitution policies.
In the above context, a key consideration is whether the existing WTO framework provides
flexibilities for local content policies in renewable energy programs. The only point of enquiry is
whether the FiT program discriminates against the imported renewable energy generation
equipment products vis-à-vis domestic products. If it does discriminate, such a measure may fall
within the blanket prohibition under the TRIMs Agreement as could be evident from the following
42

Id.

See World Trade Organization, Certain Local Contents in Some of the Renewable Energy Programs,
Questions by India to the United States, G/TRIMS/W/117 (April 17, 2013).
43

George Smitherman, Ontario Legislative Assembly Debates (Hansard), 39th Parliament First Session, (February
23,
2009),
4937,
4952,
available
at
http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/houseproceedings/house_detail.do?Date=2009-0223&Parl=39&Sess=1&locale=en#P388_90530 (highlighting
Ontario’s policy on renewable energy and energy conservation).
44
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treaty provisions.

Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that:
Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 in turn states that:
An illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with obligation of national treatment provided
for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained
in the Annex to this Agreement.
Paragraph 1(a) of the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement states that:
TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4
of Article III of GATT 1994 includes those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic
law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage,
and which require:
(a)

the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any

domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value
of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production.
A number of renewable energy programs including FiT schemes make it obligatory on the
generators to purchase or use a sufficient proportion of domestic goods or to meet the minimum
required domestic content in order to receive the guaranteed, long-term rates under the FiT
scheme. If there is a preference for domestic goods over imported goods for availing a benefit, it
is more than sufficient to hold that that such a requirement is a prohibited TRIM.
Considering the zero tolerance that the GATT treaty and the TRIMs Agreement have shown to
domestic content requirements, a number of well-meaning subsidies are per se considered as
prohibited. However, there is a disconnect here, between the WTO legal standard and the
renewable energy policies of a vast majority of WTO members. Domestic content requirement are
highly pervasive and various federal, sub-federal and municipal units establish domestic content
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requirements or “buy local” provisions to receive government support.45 It will be inconceivable
at this stage to negotiate flexible standards in regard to domestic content use either in the TRIMs
Agreement or any other multilateral framework. It is necessary to find the flexibility somewhere
else. Section C examines the availability of policy space under the WTO.
Renewable Energy and Lack of Policy Space under the WTO
Both the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement work in a fairly rigid and inflexible way at
present, in the absence of clearly spelt out exceptions for environmental purposes. The “greenlight” subsidies, i.e., the government measures that deemed certain governmental assistance nonactionable under the SCM Agreement expired at the end of 1999 given the lack of consensus
among the WTO Members to extend them.46 The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) had a “due
restraint” clause (commonly referred to as the “Peace Clause”) in Article 13, which exempted green
box measures from countervailing actions and multilateral challenge under the SCM Agreement
during the implementation period. Although there is a clamour for reinstating such a safe haven
for the purpose of promoting renewable energy or for climate change mitigation or adaptation, for
all practical purposes, no formal decision has been taken for extending such flexibility. Therefore,
no subsidy is immune from challenge for the time being.
In the absence of specific exceptions, WTO Members can only turn to general exceptions under
the GATT. Article XX of the GATT 1994 provides exceptions for measures “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health” or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources”. Article XX (b) permits the adoption of measures that are “necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health” and has been used in several WTO disputes. This exception is not
limited to public health policy measures, but also covers ‘environmental’ measures. In Brazil-Tyres,
the Appellate Body commented that Article XX(b) could also include climate change measures. 47
Article XX (g) of the GATT, on the other hand, permits the adoption of measures that are related
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, provided that such measures are made
Supra note 9 (listing the RE programs of specific countries and a detailed account of various TRIMs
requirements).
45

SCM Agreement, art 3. The SCM Agreement as it originally entered into force contained a third category
— non-actionable subsidies. This category (along with a provision establishing a presumption of serious
prejudice in respect of certain specified types of actionable subsidies) applied provisionally for five years
ending 31 December 1999, and pursuant to Art. 31 of the Agreement could be extended by consensus of
the SCM Committee. As of 31 December 1999, no such consensus had been reached.
46

Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶224, WT/DS332/AB/R
(December 3, 2007); see also Christopher Tran, Using GATT, Article XX to justify Climate Change Measures
in Claims under the WTO Agreements, 27 ENV’L & PLANNING LAW J., 346 (arguing how climate change
measures can pass muster under Article XX).
47
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effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. In WTO
dispute settlement, this provision was first invoked in US- Gasoline, where it was determined that
“a policy to reduce the depletion of an exhaustible natural resource” was within the meaning of
Article XX (g).48
In the context of renewable energy one of the key questions is whether a WTO member can
successfully avail the general exceptions under Article XX of the GATT. In other words, can
Article XX justify a violation to Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement given the absence of a
specific provision? This is an unresolved and lively issue and there are differing opinions on the
applicability of Article XX.
The WTO Appellate Body in China- Audiovisual49 ruled that the applicability of Article XX beyond
the GATT framework could not be excluded altogether. This particular reasoning was rejected by
the Appellate Body in China- Raw Materials.50 In any case, this will be an issue that has to be
examined case-by-case, agreement-by-agreement, or accession protocol-by-accession protocol.
The question whether GATT Article XX could apply in respect of other Annex IA Agreement
was also addressed in the recent dispute of United States- Poultry.51 The WTO panel was of the view
that a measure that was already found to be in violation of the SPS Agreement, and which expressly
incorporates Article XX (b) of the GATT, could not be justified by having direct recourse to
Article XX (b) of the GATT. Therefore, a more conservative view would limit Article XX
exceptions generally to GATT 1994 and not to other Annex IA Agreements, which broadly come
under the category of lex specialis.
The availability of general exceptions and exemptions is key to enabling the WTO members to
preserve their policy space in areas such as renewable energy. The lack of a negotiating mandate
for a substantive agreement on renewable energy subsidies within the WTO accentuates this
difficulty for WTO members to encourage renewable energy programs. However, it looks
improbable, in the absence of clear textual support, that the Appellate Body would accept a defence

Appellate Body Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 14,
WT/DS2/AB/R, 20, (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter US- Gasoline].
48

Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶83, WT/DS363/AB/R, (December 21, 2009).
49

Appellate Body Report, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS
394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS 398/AB/R, ¶303 (January 30, 2012) [hereinafter China- Raw
Materials].
50

Panel Report, United States- Certain Measures Affecting Poultry from China, WT/DS 392/R, ¶ 4.116.
(September 29, 2010),
51
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under Article XX for a violation of a prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement or an
illustrative TRIM under the TRIMs Agreement. As one commentator put it, it will be unreasonable
to expect a panel or Appellate Body to adopt a “heroic approach to interpretation” to fill this
void.52

Conclusion
The renewable energy sector has a crucial role in ensuring energy security and in addressing
concerns of climate change. The dependence on fossil fuel based energy resources will have to be
progressively reduced. It is, therefore, essential that rules of international trading system, which
were crafted almost two decades ago, are interpreted in an evolutionary manner.
There is at least some evidence that well targeted subsidies themselves are not a significant area of
concern in the field of renewable energy, but it is the provision of subsidies tied to the use of
domestic inputs and renewable energy equipment over imported goods that make some of the
renewable energy programs prohibited subsidies. Whatever be the economic merits in prohibiting
such practices, it is important to secure political support for renewable energy programs and to
attract investors to make long-term investments in this field. Domestic content requirements and
local employment creation could be reasonable means for encouraging investment in this field.
This paper has, however, argued that the room for flexibility in trade rules at present is very limited.
The lack of specific exceptions and exemptions under the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs
Agreement will create insuperable difficulty for the implementation of various renewable energy
programs.
Given this lack of flexibility under the GATT, SCM and TRIMS Agreements, judicial organs of
the WTO are likely to spend considerable time in interpreting the meaning of rather plain treaty
texts or common terms such as “financial contribution”, “benefit”, “advantage” and their different
variants under the SCM Agreement or such similar expressions under the GATT or the TRIMs
Agreement in the future. It would have been far more desirable had a sectoral or stand-alone
agreement on renewable energy was agreed upon to avoid these complexities. However, until a
long-term framework is identified and agreed upon, the WTO panels and Appellate Body will have
to carefully tread the field of renewable energy and international trade regulation. A false step taken
in this direction could completely unsettle several renewable energy programs and could foil fresh
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Condon, Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895, 911-913 (2009).
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